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3. DID THE MEMBERS OF THEJUSTICE DEPARTMENT'S OFFICE OF
LEGAL COUNSEL COMMIT MALPRACTICE' IN 2002 BYADVISING THAT
THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS DID NOT APPLY TO AL QAEDA AND THE
TALIBAN?
4.

DID THE MEMBERS OF THEJUSTICE DEPARTMENT'S OFFICE OF
LEGAL COUNSEL COMMIT MALPRACTICE IN 2002 BY ITS WRITTEN
GUIDANCE TO THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ON
INTERROGATION STANDARDS?

I.

BACKGROUND

To provide my response to these questions, I believe it is
necessary to provide background as to what the Office of Legal
Counsel (OLC) does and remind the reader about the historical
Attorney at Law, Washington, D.C.
t
1. 1 will analyze malpractice by employing the simplest definition: "[a]
lawyer's failure to render professional services with the skill, prudence, and
diligence that an ordinary and reasonable lawyer would use under similar
circumstances." BLAcK'S LAw DiCrIONARY 978 (8th ed. 2004).
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background of these two legal opinions.
OLC is part of the Department of Justice and employs some of
the finest lawyers in the United States. In the words of then
Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Stephen Bradbury,
OLC has only one purpose which is "to advise the President and
In the same
executive agencies on questions of law.",2
memorandum previously cited, Mr. Bradbury also wrote that '[t]he
value of an OLC opinion depends upon the strength of its analysis.
Over the years, OLC has earned a reputation for giving candid,
independent, and principled advice-even when that advice may
be inconsistent with the desires of the policymakers."
I chose this passage because I believe it best describes that
OLC does not have a traditional client as would an attorney in
private practice. Candid, principled, and independent advice
means that the OLC lawyer is obligated to analyze the law and the
law alone without reference to the goals of the President or others
employed in the executive branch. While an attorney in private
practice would be obligated to zealously represent his or her client
and might thereby argue strained interpretations of the law, OLC
attorneys only represent the law. OLC lawyers are tasked to
provide advice to persons who have sworn to defend the
Constitution and uphold the law. The President, as a person, is
therefore not OLC's client, and OLC has no obligation to zealously
support the political goals of the President.
In 2002, as the Twin Towers smoldered and the Pentagon was
being rebuilt after the September 11 attacks, the U.S. Government
was facing what it viewed as a mortal threat at home. At the same
time, it was at war against the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan
and other places around the world. The policymakers surely
wanted to do all that they could to prevent another attack and
learn everything they could from the terrorists and Taliban
members that they began to capture. In this regard, these two
memoranda served the interests of the policymakers by giving them
the green light to detain and interrogate suspects without risk of
prosecution under U.S. law. At the same time, these memoranda
also address complicated issues of federal and international law
about which lawyers could disagree. The point is that there is
2. Memorandum from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Att'y
Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to Attorneys of the Office, Best Practices for OLC
Opinions (May 16, 2005), availabk at http://www.justice.gov/olc/best-practicesmemo.pdf.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol36/iss5/7

2

MacMahon: Responses to the Ten Questions

2010]

TEN QUESTIONS: MACMAHON

5089

always a tension that arises when the law is interpreted during a
time of war.
It bears reminding that these attorneys were not the first
lawyers to be asked to "interpret" the law and the Constitution in a
time of war. 3 President Roosevelt's attorneys allowed the Ex parte
Quirin defendants to be executed before the Supreme Court even
issued an opinion affirming the sentences.4 Presidents Nixon,
Wilson, Lincoln, and others relied upon attorneys to advance their
interests. Here, though, it is clear that these lawyers did commit
malpractice in issuing the Interrogation Memorandum. On the
other hand, I do not find that the lawyers who issued the
memorandum regarding the Geneva Conventions committed
malpractice. This paper presents the rationale for these decisions.
II. THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS MEMORANDUM

The specific question posed to OLC in the January 9, 2002,
memorandum was whether the "laws of armed conflict apply to the
conditions of detention and the procedures for trial of members of
Al Qaeda and the Taliban militia." The answer provided was, in
short, that international treaties did not provide protections to
these people as they were either not lawful combatants wearing a
uniform or fighting for an organized armed force of a nation that
was a party to the Geneva Conventions.
These opinions are
certainly reasoned and arguably justified under applicable law. It is
important to recognize that the Supreme Court disagreed with
much of these opinions as can be seen in the Hamdi and Hamdan
decisions. However, it is obvious that an attorney that loses at the
Supreme Court does not automatically commit malpractice.
There are, for sure, certain parts of the opinion that are very
difficult to support as a reasonable interpretation of the law. Most
significantly, the opinion draws the conclusion that Common
Article 3 of the Geneva Convention is not applicable to captured

3.

See generally WnIJAM H.

LIBERTIES IN WARTIME (1998)

REHNQUIST,

ALL THE LAwS BUT

ONE: CIVIL

(Chief Justice Rehnquist's interpretations of civil

liberties during wartime).
4.

PIERCE O'DONNELL, IN TIME OF WAR: HrrLER's TERRORIST ATrACK ON

244-53 (2005).
5. Memorandum Opinion from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att'y Gen., to Alberto
R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Status of Taliban Forces under Article 4 of
the Third Geneva Convention of 1949 (Feb. 7, 2002), availabk at
http://www.justice.gov/olc/2002/pub-artc4potusdetermination.pdf.
AMERICA
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members of al Qaeda and the Taliban militia. This is significant
because 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (c) (3) of the War Crimes Act defines as a
war crime conduct that "constitutes a violation of common article
3" of the Geneva Convention. That statute, if applicable, would
have made it a violation of federal law to commit any "outrages
upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading
treatment" upon an al Qaeda detainee. Such a legal finding would
have crippled the "enhanced" interrogation techniques that
followed and were plainly contemplated at that time. Similarly, had
Common Article 3 been deemed to have applied, the military
commissions then contemplated would have plainly failed the test
in section (d) which prohibits the "passing of sentences and the
carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced

by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial
guarantees which are recognized by civilized peoples." Of course,
we know that the Supreme Court in Hamdandid later hold that the
commissions as then constituted did fail this test.
While I believe that most legal analysts would have decided
that Common Article 3 did apply to al Qaeda and the Taliban
militia, I do not believe that malpractice was committed by finding
to the contrary. That is because it was arguable that Afghanistan
was not, during the time at issue, part of the territory of one of the
High Contracting Parties. While this analysis is sloppy, citing, for
example, to newspaper articles, I believe that the writers of this
opinion made it clear that the President retained the option to
determine whether, as a matter of policy, the standards of the
applicable treaties applied to the U.S. Armed Forces. As I do not
see this as a "roadmap" to violate the law or in derogation of the
standard of care, I do not believe that malpractice was committed
in this regard.
III. THE INTERROGATION MEMORANDUM
The stated purpose of the August 1, 2002, memorandum was
to solicit the OLC's opinion as to the applicability of the
Convention Against Torture, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A, to certain
"interrogations taking place outside of the United States." This
memorandum approved as legal acts which "may be cruel,
inhuman or degrading but still not produce pain and suffering of
the requisite intensity to fall within Section 2340A's proscription
against torture."
It was this memorandum that approved
waterboarding and many other practices that I believe are plainly
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torture as defined under the law. As such, I do assert that it was
malpractice for OLC to have issued this opinion. I say this for two
distinct reasons.
Many legal analysts have written that the legal work set forth in
6
the opinion was sloppy and indefensible.
We know that Jack
Goldsmith, when he became head of OLC in 2004, reversed this
opinion as flawed. OLC was obligated to provide an independent
and principled opinion on the applicability of the Convention
Against Torture to the interrogation program that was planned.
The sloppiness and flawed nature of the analysis constitutes
malpractice in and of itself. More importantly, this flawed analysis
was in my judgment done intentionally so as to allow the
interrogation program to proceed in a manner cloaked with
legality regardless of the correct application of the law. This was,
thus, the most dangerous and invidious form of malpractice
because of its intentional nature.
It is submitted that the real purpose of this memorandum was
to provide legal cover for those who were about to or had approved
actions which all of us would consider torture and thus a violation
of federal criminal law had such treatment been inflicted on a
member of the U.S. Armed Forces. Attorneys who have given legal
advice designed to assist someone planning to violate federal law
have been prosecuted for aiding and abetting such violations. This
opinion deserves no greater respect.
There are two parts of this opinion that are plainly designed to
provide a legal defense, in advance, to any government actor who
might later face prosecution for torturing a captured member of al
Qaeda or the Taliban militia. First, the interpretation of specific
intent is quite strained and "defendant friendly," and the opinion
of December 30, 2004, which abrogated the subject memorandum,
properly eliminated it as unnecessary. It was written that specific
intent means that the actor must have expressly "intend[ed] to
achieve the forbidden act.., knowledge alone that a particular
result is certain to occur does not constitute specific intent., 7 From

6.

Milan Markovic, Can Lanyers Be War Criminals?, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS

347, 350-51 (2007).
7. Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att'y Gen., Office of Legal
Counsel, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Standards of Conduct
for Interrogation under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A, 3-4 (Aug. 1, 2002), available at
http://fll.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/nytimes/docs/doj/bybee80l02mem.pd

f [hereinafter Bybee Torture Memo].
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personal knowledge, many federal prisoners I have represented
would have preferred that instruction to the ones they received on
this subject. Suffice it to say that such a definition would allow
anyone to argue essentially that though the detainee eventually
died while being interrogated, it was not his intent to injure him at
all when it started. This interpretation provides tremendous leeway
to the interrogators, and I believe that was the purpose.
OLC's obligation is not to provide "get out ofjail free" cards to
those intending to violate the law. Yet, this memorandum does
exactly that. Indeed, much of the opinion is dedicated to an
examination of "possible defenses that would negate any claim that
certain interrogation methods violate the statute." The question
posed was to interpret the law. Instead, OLC provides potential
defenses to a violation of the law. When you look at the reasoning
provided in support of these defenses, you can quickly see why this
opinion has been described as sloppy and flawed.
The authors write that "Lelven if an interrogation method
arguably were to violate Section 2340A, the statute would be
unconstitutional if it impermissibly encroached upon the
President's constitutional power to conduct a military
campaign.... Any effort to apply Section 2340A in a manner that
interferes with the President's direction of such core war matters as
the detention and interrogation of enemy combatants thus would
be unconstitutional."8
It is frankly difficult to fathom, given the fact that we live in a
constitutional democracy, that OLC lawyers could argue that the
President was above the law and could violate the law as he sees fit
just because a state of war existed. Certainly the President could
argue that political position in a speech or to the Congress. Yet as
to OLC, one would have thought that the holding in United States v.
Nixon would have resolved the argument once and for all. And, in
support of this specious claim, the writers cite only to cases
involving the enforcement of congressional subpoenas. There is
no legal question that the President has the constitutional authority
to wage war. But in doing so, he must rely upon the Congress to
declare war and to fund the troops. There is no question that the
President, when conducting a war, may issue orders to interrogate
and detain the enemy. But in doing so, he must abide by the law
and applicable international treaties. To argue otherwise is simply
8. Id.at 31.
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malpractice intended solely to assist the policymaker seeking to
advance a political argument.
Finally, the memorandum lists the defenses of necessity and
self defense as available to one who violates the torture statute. As
was true above, to answer the question presented, OLC was not
called upon to provide legal defenses to the interrogators and their
bosses. Worse yet, the advice provided is stunning. In a sweeping
statement, the writers argue that literally any action required to
obtain information from a detainee would be justified under the
concept of self-defense. "(W] e believe that a claim by an individual
of the defense of another would be further supported by the fact
that, in this case, the nation itself is under attack and has the right
to self-defense." 9 As if that was not broad enough, the writers
conclude that "a government defendant may also argue that his
conduct of an interrogation, if properly authorized, is justified on
To expand the
the basis of protecting the nation from attack."1'
principal of self-defense to include any criminal act, even an
intentional killing, undertaken by anyone working for the federal
government involved in the interrogation program is plainly
malpractice."
Any doubt that this opinion was written with an eye towards
providing immunity in advance to those involved in the
interrogation program is resolved in the penultimate sentence in
the memorandum. There, the writers show their cards and provide
substantial evidence of malpractice. "[E]ven if an interrogation
method might violate Section 2340A, necessity or self-defense 2 could
provide justifications that would eliminate criminal liability."'1
Thus we have come full circle. OLC opinions are to be
independent and candid. They are to be true to the law and not
drafted to please policymakers. Here, we have an opinion that was
not only drafted to please policymakers but to provide a shield
against prosecution for violations of the law. That, I believe, meets
the definition of malpractice.
9.
10.

Id. at 44.
Id. at 45.

11. This argument was also rejected on December 30, 2004. "There is no
exception under the statute permitting torture to be used for a 'good reason."'
Memorandum Opinion from Daniel Levin, Acting Assistant Att'y Gen., Office of
Legal Counsel, to the Deputy Att'y Gen., Legal Standards Applicable under 18
availabe
at
(Dec.
30,
2004),
U.S.C.
§§
2340-2340A
http://www.justice.gov/olc/18usc23402340a2.htm.
12. Bybee Torture Memo, supranote 7, at 46.
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